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Abstract 
 
Financial development is definitely a determinant of the extent of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflow into an economy. Yet, the contribution of financial development (FD) can be 
dependent on the political situation of the recipient nation. Higher political stability aids financial 
institutions to reap the benefits of FDI efficiently. Our paper empirically investigates the role of 
political risk in the association of FDI and FD. Using a panel of 97 countries, we show the 
relationship to be strictly non-linear. The impact of FD on FDI becomes negative beyond a 
threshold level of FD. However, we do find political risk factors to be affecting the relationship 
by altering the threshold level of financial development.  
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I. Introduction 
Financial Development is an integral component of the growth process of an economy. 
According to Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000), financial development indicators 
measure the size, activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets. The 
indispensable role of financial system has been accepted by economists like Schumpeter (1912), 
Hick (1969) and McKinnon (1973). In Schumpeter‟s words, “The banker… is not so much 
primarily a middleman in the commodity „purchasing power‟ as a producer of this 
commodity…He stands between those who wish to form new combinations and the possessors 
of productive means. He is essentially a phenomenon of development, though only when no 
central authority directs the social process. He makes possible the carrying out of new 
combinations, authorizes people, in the name of society as it were, to form them. He is the ephor 
[overseer] of the exchange economy.”(Schumpeter, 1934, p174). King and Levine (1993a, 
1993b, 1993c) and Levine (1997) re-established the importance of efficient financial markets 
during recent times. Apart from having a first order impact on growth, financial development 
also affect other aspects of economic development. Financial development can make foreign aid 
work better for aid recipient countries (Nkusu and Sayek, 2004). Further, Beck (2002) has 
proved that countries with an effective financial sector have a comparative advantage in 
manufacturing industries. An agreed view of the functions of financial development identify the 
following functions – channelizing resources efficiently, mobilizing savings, reducing 
information asymmetry problem, facilitating trading, hedging, pooling and diversification of risk, 
aiding the exchange of goods and services and monitoring managers by exerting corporate 
control. 
 We revisit the links between financial development and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Previous literature has already explored the connection in the context of growth (Hermes and 
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Lensink, 2003). Another strand of literature has attributed the uneven distribution of financial 
development to the political stability of the respective nations (Roe and Siegel, 2007). They 
argue that political stability is crucial for a nation since it helps build institutions such as investor 
protection which, in turn, aids the financial sector. Hess (2004) argues that firms are willing to 
invest in nations which experience political stability. Yet, no literature has explored the 
interlinkage among political risks, FDI and FD. The main contribution of the paper is to 
investigate the role political stability plays in enhancing the relationship shared by FDI and FD.  
 Is it sufficient for a country to have competent financial markets to lure foreign capital? 
We argue that a stable political scenario is critical to attract FDI even in the presence of an 
efficient financial sector. Using a panel of 97 countries over a period of 20 years, the results 
establish a non-linear association between financial development and FDI inflows. Financial 
Development leads to greater FDI inflows up to a certain level of financial development. Beyond 
that the association becomes negative. But the presence of higher political stability adds a 
different flavor to the relationship. With higher political stability, the negative impact sets in at 
relatively higher levels of financial development.  Thus, the co-existence of competent financial 
markets and political stability is absolutely necessary to capture and utilize the benefits of FDI. 
 Section II explores the connections between financial development and FDI inflow and 
the role played by political risk in this context. Section III describes the data used in the paper. 
Section IV presents the benchmark results alongside reconfirming the non-linear association. In 
Section V we run the specifications by introducing political risk factors. Section VI talks about 
the various robustness analysis and Section VII summarizes. 
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II. Exploring the Linkages  
The prospects of development for economies, especially the emerging markets and the 
developing world, are dependant largely on their potentials to make profitable investments and 
also to accumulate capital. In the absence of unlimited resources and proper infrastructure, 
foreign capital seems to be the sole way out for these economies. Yet, some types of capital 
investments like short-term credits and portfolio investments are riskier since they cannot 
recover back quickly during periods of financial crisis. Since foreign direct investment has the 
greatest advantage in this respect, countries should try to attract such investment flows as part of 
their development plans (Prasad et. al., 2003). Realizing the importance of FDI inflows, the 
developing world and transition economies have responded quickly since the 1990s and foreign 
investments have reached enormous figures since then. According to IMF sources, FDI inflows 
to developing countries increased by an average of 23 percent a year during the period 1990-
2000. 
 Should a host country incorporate FDI as part of its development project? The answer 
solely depends on the amount of positive spillovers (externalities) generated by FDI inflows for 
the host country. It is agreed that the spillovers are generated through technological diffusion and 
also to some extent, through knowledge creation. These spillovers are generally in the form of 
firm-specific assets (Markusen, 2002) like enhanced marketing strategies, superior management 
or production techniques, enhancement of private capital formation (Ramirez, 2006). Recent 
literature points out that multinational firm can also generate pecuniary externality for the firms 
in the host country (Markusen and Venables, 1999). Such externalities are generated via 
reduction in cost or increased revenues. The spillover effects, in turn, have positive impacts on 
the growth of an economy. Knowledge spillovers are usually in the form of imitation of 
technology and technical know-how. Researches have proved that factors like better financial 
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development, greater human capital and higher trade openness enhance the positive relationship 
between FDI and growth (Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford, 1996; Alfaro et. al., 2003; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2003).  
 This paper initially explores the direct linkages between financial development and FDI 
inflows. It reestablishes the positive association between the two.  Hermes and Lensink (2003) 
investigate the association of FDI and growth in a cross sectional set up. They have come up 
with several justifications as to why a developed financial system should have a positive impact 
of FDI. A developed financial system mobilizes savings efficiently which, in turn, expand the 
amount of resources available to finance investment. Also, it filters and monitors investment 
projects by reducing information acquisition costs. Financial development also speeds up 
adoption of new technologies by minimizing the risk associated with it. With developed financial 
infrastructure, the foreign firms are able to judge how much they can borrow for innovative 
activities and are able to make ex-ante planning about their investments. Financial development 
also increases liquidity and, thus, facilitates trading of financial instruments and timing and 
settlement of such trades (Levine, 1997). This will also lead to greater FDI inflows as the 
projects can be undertaken with lesser time being spent in settling the trades. We, further, 
hypothesize that the relationship is strictly non-linear. Rioja and Valev (2004) also proved the 
existence of non-linear relationship between FDI and growth. The association between financial 
development and FDI inflows is positive after a threshold level of financial development is 
reached
1
.  Better financial institutions attract greater foreign capital. But, for significantly higher 
levels of financial development, the impact is negative. Once the country reaches substantially 
higher levels of financial development, lesser and lesser foreign investment is needed to boost 
                                                          
1
 Overall financial development and FDI have a concave relationship. At very low levels of financial development, 
the relationship becomes ambiguous. For such levels of financial development, firms suffer from constrained cash 
flows and, thus, cannot attract greater FDI inflows (Rioja and Valev, 2004). The relationship is ambiguous in the 
sense that FDI inflow occur due to factors other than financial development. 
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the economy. Domestic investment is adequate to sustain and pace up the growth rate of such 
economies. 
 Levine (1997) admits that financial markets work in conjunction with institutions and that 
the latter has an important role to play in the performance of the former. Using cross country 
regressions, Kapuria-Foreman (2007) finds that certain components of economic freedom are 
positively affected with foreign direct investment. Keeping such observations in mind, we delve 
deeper into the role played by political risks in enhancing or degrading the association between 
financial development and foreign direct investment inflows. There have been several cross-
country studies based on international data regarding the impact of policy-related variables like 
intellectual property protection, corruption and institutional uncertainty on FDI inflows (Lee and 
Mansfield, 1996; Brunetti and Weder, 1998; Wei, 2000). Recently, several studies have studied 
the impact of democratic institutions on FDI inflows. While one strand of thought shows the 
relationship to be positive (Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Jensen, 2003; Busse, 2004), Li and 
Resnick (2003) argue that there is more to the relationship. Though democratic right has an 
indirect boosting impact on FDI inflows by improving property rights protection, the direct 
impact on FDI is negative. Busse and Hefeker (2005) show in their study that some aspects of 
political stability like government stability, the absence of internal and external conflicts, basic 
democratic rights and an efficient law and order system, matter  significantly in determining FDI 
inflows. They show that foreign investors are susceptible to changes in political stability of an 
economy. 
 According to the law and finance literature, institutions that provide investor protection 
have been proved crucial for financial development. According to Roe and Siegel
2
 (2007), an 
                                                          
2
 There are many explanations as to what generates investor protection which, in turn, aids the formation of efficient 
financial infrastructure. La Porta et al (1997, 1998) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) claim that legal 
origin is key to investor protection and, thus, to financial development. Common law nations are crucial for financial 
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economy‟s capacity to develop and foster investor protection is largely dependent on the political 
stability scenario. They argue that unstable governments cannot credibly commit to policies that 
can encourage and foster entrepreneurial functions, saving and functioning of the financial 
markets. They, further, argue that political instability can bring about poor macroeconomic 
policy and, thus, can hamper the development of financial infrastructure. Thus, the role of 
political stability cannot be ignored while investigating the association between financial 
development and FDI inflows. Political risk seems to be crucial from the aspects of both 
financial development and inflows of foreign capital.  
A better functioning financial market is critical for determining the amount of FDI 
inflows to a nation but is not sufficient. Political stability is absolutely necessary along with 
financial competence for attracting foreign investors. Political stability will ensure that there are 
less expropriation risks and government can credibly commit to aid the functioning of financial 
market. It will accelerate the adoption of new technologies and also internalize the spillovers. 
These enhance investor confidence in the host country and bring in more foreign capital.  A 
decent level of financial development in the presence of high political instability will actually 
achieve little in terms of FDI inflows. We cite a couple of evidences from the raw data as support 
to our hypothesis. Chile has a good score for financial infrastructure. Yet, during the mid 
eighties, it had relatively high levels of political risks in the form of unstable government, high 
risks associated with investment and strong involvement of military with politics. As a 
consequence, FDI inflows were lower for those years. As political stability was achieved over 
the later years, there was greater influx of FDI into the country. Again, for Malta both levels of 
                                                                                                                                                              
outcomes since they provide investor protection while civil law nations suffer from financial inefficiency. Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) show that trade openness can explain the stark variation in financial development across nations. 
They argue that special interest groups have strong incentives to block the development of a transparent and 
competitive financial sector. Yet, those incentives may be weakened with the opening of international trade and the 
international flows of capital. Colonial origins form the basis for another set of explanations. According to 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), colonial origins determined earlier institutional structure and are the sole 
factors that matter for an efficient financial system. 
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financial development and political stability seem to be essential for foreign direct investments. 
The amount of FDI inflows went up from a meager 2.46 units as a percentage of GDP in 1984 to 
20.16 units in 2003. There was improvement in financial infrastructure (the figures went up from 
0.47 to 1.05) but greater political stability was also achieved during the same period. While 
government stability went up from 7 to 10.5, investment profile went up from 7 to 11.  
 
III. Data 
 
The data used for analysis has been taken from various sources. The data on FDI, the dependent 
variable, is taken from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
database. The measure considered is FDI inflow to a country as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)
3
. The primary independent variable namely “financial development (FD)” has 
been taken from the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) database of indicators of financial 
development across countries over time. Amongst the various measures of financial development 
listed in the article we mainly use the ratio of private credit by deposit money bank to GDP. This 
is the most widely used measure of financial development and captures one of the main activities 
of financial intermediaries, namely, channelizing savings to investors. Furthermore the measure 
accounts for credit issued to the private sector (as opposed to government and public enterprises) 
by intermediaries other than Central Bank. Later for robustness checks we use other measures of 
financial development from the dataset namely the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions over GDP. This accounts for the activities of financial 
intermediaries. We further use domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of 
GDP and domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP as measures of financial 
                                                          
3
 We consider alternative data sources for FDI later. 
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development. Both these measures are taken from the World Development Indicator (WDI) 
database. 
 Besides financial development, we use several other explanatory variables for our main 
regression. Annual growth of GDP
4
 (Nonnemberg and Mendonca, 2004) and population are 
taken from World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005. An increased population 
definitely leads to diversification in tastes and preferences and a look out for a variety of high 
standard opportunities, which in an era of globalization is well catered to by FDI. Inflation and 
exchange rate (Froot and Stein, 1991; Garibaldi et al, 2001) are taken from the Penn World 
Table. Both of these definitely have a strong impact on FDI inflows since their stability decides 
how lucrative the destination country is for the inflowing FDI. Exchange rate gained prominence 
with the study of Froot and Stein (1991), who, in an imperfect capital market showed how 
currency depreciation leads to increased foreign investment inflow. To control for openness 
(Nonnemberg and Mendonca, 2004) we rely on data from the Penn World Table. We take the 
value of openness in 2000 constant prices where openness is defined as total trade as a 
percentage of real GDP per capita. To check for robustness we later include natural resources 
and secondary years of schooling as our control variables. The former is taken from the Sachs 
and Warner database while the latter from the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset. 
 Finally we use regional dummies as additional regressors to avoid any regional bias. The 
regional dummy variables considered are Middle East and North Africa (MEN), South East Asia 
(SAR), East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (EAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We control for time effects in our specification.
 To further our analysis we use various country specific political risk indicators from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. These in conjunction with financial 
                                                          
4
 Since both the FDI and FD measure are with respect to GDP, we do not use GDP as a control variable. 
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development helps us not only to analyze the causal connection better but also in having a fair 
idea about which risk factor matters more. The variables taken into account are government 
stability, democratic accountability, law and order, investment profile, corruption, bureaucratic 
quality, ethnic tension, socio-economic condition, internal conflict, external conflict, military in 
politics and religious tensions. Each of these variables has a particular range of values assigned 
to it and higher values signify better condition.  
Borenzstein et. al (1992) tested the effect of FDI on economic growth using cross country 
regressions for 69 developing countries. De Gregorio (1992) found a significant impact of FDI 
on growth using a panel analysis of 12 Latin American countries while Blomstrom et al (1996) 
found the same using a panel of least developed nations. De Mello (1996) employed both time 
series and cross section analysis to establish the complementarity between FDI and domestic 
investment. Calvo and Sanchez-Robles (2002) have delved into the interlinkages among FDI, 
economic freedom and economic growth. According to them
5
, panel approach is relatively better 
than cross section analysis since it takes into account the variability within countries and also 
“allow for differences in production function of the various nations in the form of unobservable 
individual effects”.  Thus, we undertake a pooled OLS6 estimation for a panel of 97 countries 
over the years 1984 to 2003. We use Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) as part of our 
robustness analysis. 
 
IV. The Empirical Assessment 
The primary regression specification is as follows 
 
                                                          
5
 Islam (1995) and Fölster and Henrekson (2001) also talk about the efficiencies of a panel approach.  
 
6
 Following previous literature, we have also checked the robustness of our findings by running both cross-country 
and 5 year panel regressions. Our results remain unaffected with the alternate specifications.  
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Where FDIit is the ratio of FDI inflow over GDP for country i at time t. Xit represent the matrix 
of control variables. The control variables are annual growth of GDP, inflation, exchange rate, 
trade openness and population. REGIONAL stands for the vector of regional dummies and  Zt  is 
the vector representing time dummies.  The independent variables of primary interest are FDit 
and FD
2
it representing financial development and its square (in country i at time t) respectively. 
As mentioned earlier, financial development is proxied by the ratio of private credit by deposit 
money bank to GDP. The squared term of financial development captures the non-linearity in the 
relationship between financial development and FDI inflow. A positive coefficient of FD should 
denote that financial development has a positive impact on FDI inflow. However a negative 
coefficient of the square term will denote that the effect declines for higher levels of financial 
development. This is infact what is shown by the data. The benchmark results are given in Table 
(1).   
The estimation results show that β1 is positive and significant at the 1% level while β2 is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. Thus we find a strictly concave relation between 
financial development and FDI inflow
7
. However after a threshold is reached, financial 
development and FDI inflow become negatively related. Annual growth rate of GDP and 
openness have positive coefficients which are significant at the 1 % level. Exchange rate has 
negative coefficient which is significant at the 1 % level. The coefficients for regional and time 
dummies are mostly significant. To interpret the result further, we consider the partial derivative 
of equation (1) with respect to financial development (FD). The derivative is defined as follows 
 
                                                          
7
 Throughout the relationship we observe diminishing returns. This implies the change in FDI inflow always 
diminishes for every unit change in FD. 
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Setting this equal to zero, a critical level of financial development can be identified. At this level, 
financial development has no impact on FDI inflow relative to GDP. From the first regression, 
this level can be identified to be 1.3. Figure (1)
8
 represents the relationship. Before financial 
development reaches a level of 1.3, FD has a positive impact on FDI inflow. Beyond this 
threshold
9
, further improvement in financial development is seen to have a negative impact on 
FDI inflow. 
We further our analysis by breaking our sample on the basis of levels of financial 
development. We consider the top, middle and bottom 33% of the sample, sorted according to 
the levels of financial development and look at how FDI inflow relates to financial development 
at its various ranges of development. The results (not reported) show that the strictly concave 
relation between financial development and FDI inflow is maintained in the top 33% of the 
sample. The result for the middle 33% sees a relaxation of the strict concavity. Here we observe 
a positive linear relation between the two. The result for the bottom 33% of the sample is 
rendered unclear.  
 
V. The Role of Political Risk Factors 
To explain, further, the observed non-linearity between financial development and FDI inflow 
and the variation for the altering ranges of financial development, we introduce political risk 
factors in our analysis. This helps us explore whether the levels of political risks play a role in 
the ability of a country to use the financial development to its advantage and reap its benefits by 
attracting more FDI. For this we alter our regression specification as 
                                                          
8
 We plot the relationship between FDI and FD for different levels of political risks. For the control variables, we 
consider the average values. The regional dummies are given the weights according to their proportion in the total 
sample. The year dummies are equally weighted.  
9
 Beyond FD =1.3, FDI is still positive but an unit rise in FD leads to less than an unit decline in FDI over GDP. 
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We include all the twelve ICRG variables into our analysis individually to gauge which all are 
important in enabling a country to take financial development in its stride and attract more FDI. 
In our new specification, the sign and significance of β4 matters the most. A positive and 
significant β4 would imply that for a given level of political risk, higher FD implies higher FDI.  
For given levels of political risk we have a concave association between the two. With higher 
and higher political stability, the concave curve shifts upward and the critical level, beyond 
which the impact is negative, corresponds to even higher levels of FD. This is depicted in figures 
later. For example, Fig 2(A) represents the graphs with government stability (GS) as the risk 
factor. For GS equal to 2, the curve always slopes down implying that higher financial 
development does not help in attracting more FDI. But as the score rises to 6.5 and then to 10.5, 
the curve shifts upward and we have positive segments in the concave plots. Similarly, for the 
other political risks (Figs 2(B) to 2(G)), as the scores the curves shift upwards we have positive 
slopes over broader ranges of financial development.  
 The results depict that out of the twelve political risk factors identified by ICRG, five 
namely, Government Stability, Law and Order, Investment Profile, Bureaucratic Quality and 
Socio-economic Condition have positive coefficients, significant at the 1% level. Military in 
Politics and Religion in Politics also have positive coefficients and are significant at the 5% 
level. Of the other variables the coefficients for annual growth rate of GDP, exchange rate and 
openness are found to be significant for all the specifications. The results are summarized in 
Table (2). 
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 For all the seven political risk factors mentioned above, we calculate the threshold level 
of financial development beyond which (as shown by our first main regression) it has a negative 
effect on FDI. We derive the derivative of FDI with respect to FD as 
 
By setting equation (4) equal to zero, and allowing for different levels of the various political 
risk factors, we derive the altering threshold level. We assign several random values (within each 
one‟s range) to these political risk factors and estimate how the threshold financial development 
alters accordingly. For all the factors, we unanimously find that improving political risk 
condition pushes the threshold level further. This implies that, as political risk gets better, the 
point at which the level of financial development has no effect on FDI inflow (i.e. where the 
slope becomes zero) gets relegated to even higher ranges of financial development. So, we can 
say that a better political risk scenario helps reap the benefits of a developing financial sector 
better and sustaining them over a broader range of financial development. In what follows we 
present our finding with each of the seven important factors separately. We bear in mind that in 
our sample, the value of financial development varies from 0 to 2.5 (with higher values 
representing higher levels of development).   
Government Stability 
This assesses the government‟s ability to stay in office and successfully meet its commitments. It 
consists of government unity, legislative strength and popular support. The score for this factor 
ranges from 0 to 12, where 0 points to “Very High Risk and 12 means “Very Low Risk”. To 
derive the various threshold levels of financial development corresponding to the altering levels 
of government stability, we choose various random levels of government stability within its 
range. We essentially choose the numbers such that it adequately represents the whole range of 
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the factor. When the score is 2, the impact of FD on FDI is always negative. As the score rises 
from 2 to 6.5 to 10.5, the threshold level for financial development rises first to 0.69 and then to 
1.32 respectively. In the graphs the calculated thresholds correspond to the levels of financial 
development for which the slope becomes zero. In other words, the tipping points of the graphs 
refer to the thresholds. (See Figure 2A).  
Law and Order 
This factor, as the name suggests, consists of law and order separately. The total score of this 
range from 0 to 6 with higher values depicting “Low Risk”.  We choose two random scores for 
law and order to be 1.5 and 5. The threshold for financial development in attracting FDI gets 
altered accordingly from 0.016 to 0.83 (See Figure 2B). 
 Investment Profile 
This comprises of three factors (namely contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and 
payment delays) affecting the risk to investment, otherwise not captured by other political, 
economic and financial risk components. It ranges from 0 to 12 with higher values corresponding 
to “Low Risk Levels”. When we choose the level of investment profile to be 2, the threshold 
financial development needed to attract FDI is 0.12. When the score for investment profile 
improves to 6.5, the threshold level of financial development also goes up to 0.81. As the score 
for investment profile soars up to 10.5, the threshold for financial development reaches 1.43 (See 
Figure 2C). 
Bureaucratic Quality 
As ICRG states “… quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize 
revisions of policy when governments change. …Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a 
strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in 
terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions”. The value of this factor 
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ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher value indicating “Lower Risk”. The threshold level of financial 
development rises from 0.04 to 1.14 as the score for Bureaucratic Quality changes from 1 to 3.5 
(See Figure 2D). 
Socio-economic Condition 
This assesses the socio-economic tensions that impacts pressure at work of a society and 
constrains government action or leads to social discontent. This factor consists of unemployment, 
consumer confidence and poverty and ranges from 0 to 12 points, with a higher value indicating 
“Lower Risk”. Here, again for very low scores like 2 the impact of FD on FDI is always 
negative. As the socio-economic score changes from 6.5 and hence to 10.5, the threshold levels 
alters from 0.64 to 1.31 respectively (See Figure 2E). 
Military in Politics 
Involvement of military in politics is taken as a diminution of democratic accountability and is 
also seen to be an indication of an internal or external threat. The score for this factor ranges 
from 0 to 6 points with a higher value indicating “Lower Risk”. When the score for military in 
politics changes from 1.5 to 5, the threshold for financial development changes from 0.40 to 0.96 
(See Figure 2F). 
Religious Tensions 
Religious tensions create rift among citizens and is a curse for the nation. It can be reflection of 
dominance of the government by any particular religion and suppression of the others and has 
the potential to initiate civil strife. The score for this factor ranges from 0 to 6, with a higher 
value indicating “Lower Risk”.  With a level of religious tension at 1.5 the threshold for financial 
development lies at 0.07 while for a level of 5, the threshold moves up to 0.88 (See Figure 2G). 
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VI. Robustness 
We apply a number of robustness checks to ensure the validity of our results. Firstly, we control 
for infrastructural and technological improvements in our specification. This is following the 
literature by Loree and Guisinger (1995), Mody and Srinivasan (1996) and Kumar (2001) which 
emphasizes that physical infrastructure play a favorable role in attracting FDI into an economy. 
Following Kumar (2001) we use telephone mainlines per 1000 people and television sets per 
1000 people as our proxies for telecommunication and information infrastructure. The results 
remain unaltered to the inclusion of this variable, both in the main specification as well as in the 
specification with ICRG variables. Our results remain robust with the inclusion of natural 
resource (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003) and secondary years of schooling (Borensztein et. al., 
1995) as control variables.  
 We also consider other measures of financial development for robustness checks. Results 
with “private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions over GDP”, 
“domestic credit by banking sector as a percentage of GDP” and “domestic credit to private 
sector as a percentage of GDP” all confirm our results. With all three measures, the main 
regression renders the coefficient of FD to be positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient of FD
2
 is negative and significant at the 1% level for the first two measures and 
negative and significant at the 5 % level for the third measure. Interactions with ICRG political 
risk variables also confirm our previous findings. The same sets of variables are seen to be 
significant here.  
We run diagnostic tests or our specifications where Durbin-Watson test identifies 
presence of autocorrelation. We correct the problem and generate more efficient estimates using 
Feasible Generalized Least Square Technique (FGLS). We apply this method to both the main 
specification as well as our extension with ICRG variables. The results are presented in column 2 
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of Table (1). For the main regression, the threshold value of financial development is still 1.3 and 
the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient FD
2
 is significant at the 10% level. 
Annual growth of GDP, exchange rate and openness are still found to be significant at the 1% 
level.  
When the ICRG variables are included, we find as before Government Stability, Law and 
Order, Investment Profile, Bureaucratic Quality and Socio-economic Condition to have positive 
coefficient significant at the 1% level. Military in politics, Religion in politics also have positive 
coefficients and are significant at the 5% level. In addition, we find Democratic Accountability 
to be positive and significant at the 5% level. When we now alter the scores of the political risk 
factors as before, the thresholds change identically, thus strengthening our findings. For 
Democratic Accountability, the threshold changes from 0.03 to 0.9 as the score is varied from 1 
to 3.5. (See Table 3) 
 
VII. Summary 
Foreign Direct Investment has been proved indispensable in the context of economic 
development. We contribute to this literature by exploring the role of political risks in the 
association between financial development and FDI inflows. Our results reveal that the 
association between the two is strictly non-linear. Beyond a critical level of financial 
development, the impact of financial development on FDI inflows is negative. But political 
stability seems to play a significant role in this context. For each level of political risk, there is a 
concave association between FD and FDI. Yet, with higher levels of political stability, financial 
development can absorb the benefits of FDI inflows in more efficient ways. Thus, each level of 
financial development is now associated with a higher level of FDI inflow. To state it more 
simply, the threshold level corresponds to higher and higher levels of financial development as 
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greater political stability is achieved. Some factors like stability of government, investment 
profile, and socioeconomic condition are comparatively more crucial than the others. Thus, an 
efficient financial infrastructure will achieve little in terms of attracting foreign investment, if the 
country suffers from political instability. 
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Figure 1: The Impact of Financial Development on FDI Inflows  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Impact of Financial Development on FDI Inflows for different 
levels of Political Risks  
                  A 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
  
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
